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Abstract
In a smart grid, the power service provider enables the expected power generation amount
to be measured according to current power consumption, thus stabilizing the power system.
However, the data transmitted over smart grids are not protected, and then suffer from sev-
eral types of security threats and attacks. Thus, a robust and efficient authentication proto-
col should be provided to strength the security of smart grid networks. As the Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition system provides the security protection between the control
center and substations in most smart grid environments, we focus on how to secure the
communications between the substations and smart appliances. Existing security
approaches fail to address the performance-security balance. In this study, we suggest a
mitigation authentication protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography with privacy protec-
tion by using a tamper-resistant device at the smart appliance side to achieve a delicate bal-
ance between performance and security of smart grids. The proposed protocol provides
some attractive features such as identity protection, mutual authentication and key agree-
ment. Finally, we demonstrate the completeness of the proposed protocol using the Gong-
Needham- Yahalom logic.
Introduction
Compared with traditional power networks, smart grid networks can avoid excess electricity
generation by adjusting the amount of electricity based on the customer’s real-time require-
ments. In general, the smart grid network can be divided into three levels: control center, sub-
stations and smart appliances [1]. In a smart grid network, smart appliances communicate
with substations by using smart meters. The smart meters send user’s requirements to the sub-
stations, and then the substations transmit the requirements to the control center. Next,
according to the received requirements, the control center can allocate adequate power supplies
to customers. The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system is used to protect the com-
munications between the control center and the substations [2], but the security problems
between other two levels remain unsolved. Although the security mechanisms between substa-
tions and smart appliances have been researched in recent years, existing security protocols are
not robust enough to resist several types of attacks. Therefore, a determined effort should be
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made to address the security issues associated with the communications between the substa-
tions and the smart appliances [3].
As smart meters are used to transmit the real-time electricity demands from customers, the
data transmission process could easily suffer from several types of security threats and attacks.
To protect the transmitted data, an efficient authentication scheme should be provided. Com-
pared with the authentication protocols designed for other scenarios such as VoIP and Ad Hoc
networks, it is more challenging to provide a suitable authentication protocol for smart grids
due to its complicated architecture and diverse security requirements. On one hand, the
authentication protocols should secure against various types of possible attacks and provide
several security features to satisfy the secure requirements of smart grids. For example, the user
privacy should be fully considered especially the user’s identity protection, to prevent the
adversary from obtaining the information about user’s daily patterns, which may not be impor-
tant in other application environments. On the other hand, smart grid communications are
more sensitive to transmission latency, and so existing security approaches with intensive com-
putation are impractical in smart grid networks.
Recently, several authentication protocols have been proposed [4–19] to protect the data
transmission between communication entities. In an attempt to prevent the adversary from
obtaining the daily habit of the customer through analyzing the electricity usage pattern, T.W.
Chim et al. [4] designed an authentication protocol by using a tamper-resistant device at the
smart appliance and a pseudo identity for the smart grid network to protect the privacy of the
customer. However the proposed protocol was suffered from impersonation attacks. Since only
substations could authenticate smart appliances, the adversary could easily impersonate the
substations to cheat the smart appliances. Besides, their protocol failed to provide a key agree-
ment function capable of protecting the communication between substations and smart appli-
ances. Furthermore, since a timestamp was used in the signing module of their protocol, the
clock synchronization problem could not be avoided. In order to reduce the computational
cost, Mostafa et al. [5] proposed a message authentication mechanism by using the Computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman assumption for smart grids. In their protocol, mutual authentication and
key agreement were realized by using Diffie-Hellman exchange protocol between the smart
meters distributed at different hierarchical networks of the smart grid system, and the subse-
quent messages could be authenticated by using a shared session key established previously
and the hash-based authentication code technique. However, the computational costs of both
protocols were still very high due to the usage of expansive exponential operations. In the same
year, Qing et al. [6] designed a multicast authentication protocol for smart grids by using one-
time signature to reduce the storage cost and the signature size. Because the one-time signa-
ture-based multicast authentication could provide short authentication delay and low compu-
tation cost, their protocol achieved a good performance. However their work only focused on
designing a light-weight authentication protocol, remained the key agreement issue unsolved.
In order to strengthen the security of smart grid communications, Soohyun Oh et al. [7]
suggested a mutual authentication and key establishment mechanism based on public key cer-
tificates for smart grid. In their protocol, the data concentration unit’s public key certificate
and pre-shared long-term key were used to realize the mutual authentication between the data
concentration unit and the intelligent devices. But the problem of distributing the shared long-
term key limited this protocol’s scalability and applicability. Biometric technique such as fin-
gerprint was also adopted to achieve strong authentication for smart grids [10]. But these pro-
tocols are very complex due to the use of biometrics. In 2013, Binod Vaidya et al. proposed an
authentication and authorization mechanism for smart grid networks [13]. They realized
multi-factor authentication and attribute-based authorization in a smart grid environment by
using public key certificates, zero-knowledge and access control technologies. But the heavy
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computational load could not be avoided since the implement of the public key certificates
management and public key cryptography calculation. In the same year, Nicanfar et al. pre-
sented a password authenticated group key agreement protocol for smart grid [15]. Although
the proposed protocol provided forward and backward secrecy and enhanced the security of
communications among the devices, the usage of expansive exponential operations decreased
the practical application of the protocol. To reduce the computational cost, a password authen-
ticated key exchange based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was proposed [17]. Com-
pared with previous studies, this protocol was more efficient due to the usage of ECC, but a
primitive password should be preloaded between an appliance and the Home Area Network
controller, which made this solution hard to scale and might arouse an intractable problem of
password table maintenance. Recently, Li et al. proposed fault-diagnosable authentication
architecture for advanced metering infrastructure in smart grid [19]. Since this work only
focused on authentication, key negotiation was not considered in the proposed authentication
mechanism.
According to above analysis, protocol [4] was suffered from impersonate attacks and proto-
cols [5, 19] were vulnerable to eavesdropping since these protocols could not provide key
agreement to protect the further communications. Moreover, protocol [17] faced some attacks
associated with password. Although some of these protocols achieved good performance, they
could not provide security at an acceptable level. Furthermore, other protocols such as [13, 15]
were secure against several attacks, but the use of expansive exponential operations, the signa-
ture generation, and the verification lead to high computational overhead and communication
delay. Therefore, these protocols are not suitable for smart grid. In general, the existing authen-
tication protocols for smart grids mentioned above are insecure against some cryptographic
attacks or impractical due to high computational costs. In addition, all the protocols discussed
above could not provide privacy protection which is very important in smart grids. Based on
these motivations, we proposed a robust and efficient authenticate protocol based on Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) with identity protection for smart grids by using tamper-resistant
attractive security properties. As ECC can achieve the same level security with a smaller key
size, it offers better performance compared with other public key cryptosystems such as RSA or
D-H. Thus, we adopted ECC to realize a mitigation authentication device at the smart appli-
ance without involving time-consuming operations.
Compared with other security approaches, public key cryptosystems can resist most of pos-
sible attacks and provide more security properties to achieve a good balance between perfor-
mance and security. By using ECC, the proposed protocol can achieve the authenticated key
agreement with privacy protection at a lower computational cost. Furthermore, according to
the characteristics of the smart grid, the control center can be considered fully trustable since it
is managed by the government administrators; the substations that have higher computational
power are difficult to be compromised than smart appliances; the smart appliances with limited
power are more vulnerable to various attacks, and it can be combined with a tamper-resist
device to protect the stored information. Taking advantage of above features, in the proposed
protocol, a tamper-resist device was used to store secret information to help providing privacy
protection through the authentication process. In addition, the control center and the substa-
tions can cooperate to complete the initialization process of the authenticated key agreement
protocol.
In the proposed protocol, the smart meters are used to transmit the real-time electricity
demands from customers intelligently. In order to protect the transmitted data, mutual authen-
tication and a shared key should be provide to protect the further communication between the
substation and the smart appliances. In the proposed protocol, the smart meters could control
when the authentication protocol begins and which appliances need to be authenticated.
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Furthermore, the shared key updating could be realized by restarting the authentication pro-
cess and the smart meter could also control the period of key updating during the communica-
tion. Therefore, the smart meter could manage the smart devices intelligently during the
authentication process. In this paper, our study focused on the design of the authentication
protocol with privacy protection, so the intelligent management of smart meters is beyond the
scope of our work.
Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) Logic [20] is the first belief logic widely used to formally
analyze the completeness of a cryptographic protocol, but it has some limitations [21]. Gong-
Needham-Yahalom (GNY) logic [22] is one of the famous extensions to overcome the inherent
limitations of BAN; and it has successfully disclosed redundancies or found defects in several
protocols. Today, GNY has been used to demonstrate the completeness of several protocols
successfully [23]. Therefore, we used the GNY logic to evaluate the security of the proposed
protocol in this study.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the Elliptic Curve
Cryptosystem. Our newly designed authentication protocol is detailed in Section 3. In Section
4, the completeness of the proposed protocol is proved through Gong-Needham-Yahalom
logic. The performance of the proposed protocol is evaluated in Section 5, and the paper is con-
cluded in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section we briefly introduce the basic concepts of the elliptic curve cryptosystem and the
corresponding problems associated with it. We also explain the reason for adopting the elliptic
curve cryptography.
ECC has been formally applied to public key cryptosystems since 1986. In an elliptic curve
cryptosystem, the elliptic curve equation is defined as the form Ep(a,b): y
2 = x3 + ax + b(mod p)
over a prime finite field Fp, where p>3, a,b 2 Fp and 4a3 + 27b2 6¼ 0(mod p). Given an integer t 2
Fp and a point P 2 Ep(a,b), the scalar multiplication tP over Ep(a,b) can be deﬁned as tP = P +
P + . . . + P(t times) [24]. And the corresponding problems associated with ECC are shown as
follows:
Definition 1. Given two points P and Q over Ep(a,b), the elliptic curve discrete logarithm prob-
lem (ECDLP) is to find an integer t 2 Fp such that Q = tP.
Definition 2. Given three points P, sP and tP over Ep(a,b) for s; t 2 Fp , the computational Dif-
fie-Hellman problem (CDHP) is to find the point stP over Ep(a,b).
Definition 3. Given two points P and Q = sP + tP over Ep(a,b) for s; t 2 Fp , the elliptic curve
factorization problem (ECFP) is to find two points sP and tP over Ep(a,b).
We assume that the three problems above are intractable. That is, there is no polynomial
time algorithm that can solve these problems with non-negligible probability.
Next, we explain why we adopted ECC to design the authentication protocol for smart grid
networks.
1) More complex: Since ECC can be implemented in different ways rather than a single
encryption algorithm; it is more complex than RSA. Moreover, the elliptic curve discrete loga-
rithm problem is more difficult to break than the factorization and discrete logarithm problem.
Although many researchers have tried to attack ECC, it is still infeasible to break ECC with
existing computational resources. Therefore, the security strength of ECC is much stronger
than other public key cryptosystems such as RSA or Diffie-Hellman (D-H).
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2) Smaller key size: as shown in Table 1, compared with RSA, ECC offers equivalent security
with smaller key sizes which implies lower power, bandwidth, and computational require-
ments. These advantages are very important when public-key cryptography is implemented for
low power environments.
3) Computational efficiency: ECC is much more efficient than RSA and D-H public proto-
cols in terms of computation, since implementing scalar multiplication in software and hard-
ware is much more feasible than performing multiplications or exponentiations in them.
According to above attractive properties of ECC, we chose it to design the proposed robust
and efficient authentication protocol for smart grids.
Our Proposed Authentication Scheme
This section details our newly designed authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy for smart grids. Considering the efficiency, ECC version for El-Gamal has been adopted
for asymmetric encryption in the proposed protocol where the cycle group used in El-Gamal is
taken from elliptic-curve. For the details, please see [24]. There were two phases in the pro-
posed protocol: initialization phase and authentication phase. The procedure of our protocol is
described in detail as follows:
Initialization phase
In this phase, several security parameters used for authentication and key agreement are calcu-
lated by the control center and the substations.
1) First, an elliptic curve equation Ep(a,b): y
2 = x3 + ax + b(mod p) over a prime finite field
Fp is selected by the control center. Here a,b 2 Fp and 4a3 + 27b2 6¼ 0(mod p). Next the control
center chooses a base point P over Ep(a, b) and writes P to the tamper-resistant device of Ui as
well as the substations.
2) The control center allocates an identity IDi for each smart appliance Ui and preloads IDi
into the memory of the corresponding tamper-resistant devices. Then the identity IDi of smart
appliance Ui is written in an ID table by the control center. Next, the control center submits the
identity table to the substation over a secure channel and assigns an identity SIDj for each sub-
station Sj. The substation Sj stores the identity SIDj in its memory securely. Finally, a one-way
hash function h(): {0,1} ! {0,1}k is selected by the control center. And the substations as well
as the tamper-resistant devices store the hash function in their memories.
3) The substation chooses a random integer s2RZp as a secret key for symmetric encryption/
decryption. And then it generates a random integer sk<n as a private key and computes its cor-
responding public key pk = skP, where n is the order of the base point P. The computed public/
private key pair (pk, sk) is used for asymmetric encryption/decryption. Then the substation cal-
culates C1 = Es(IDi) and C2 = SIDjP for every smart appliance Ui. The system key s and the pub-
lic/private key pair (pk, sk) are kept secret by the substation. Furthermore, the substation writes
the public key pk and the pair secret (C1, C2) into each corresponding tamper-resistant device.
Table 1. Comparison of the key length between RSA and ECC on the same security level.
Key length of ECC (bits) Key length of an RSA (bits) Key length ratio
160 1024 1:6
256 3072 1:12
384 7680 1:20
512 15,360 1:12
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151253.t001
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If a new smart appliance Uj wants to incorporate into the smart grid, the control center and
the substation should cooperate to complete the initialization of the new appliance. First, the
control center allocates a new identity IDj for Uj and records it in the ID table. Then it sends
the identity of the new smart appliance to the corresponding substation over a secure channel.
Having received the message, the substation records the identity in its ID table and then com-
putes a secret (C1, C2) for the new smart appliance. Finally, the substation writes the point P,
the one-way hash function, the identity IDj, the public key pk and the pair secret (C1, C2) into
the tamper-resistant device of Uj to achieve the initialization of the new smart appliance.
Authentication phase
During the authentication process, the substation and the smart appliance Ui perform the fol-
lowing four steps to realize mutual authentication and key agreement.
1) First, the tamper-resistant device of Ui selects an integer r12RZp randomly to compute
C3 = epk(IDikC1kr1), where epk(•) denotes the public key encryption function using the substa-
tion Sj’s public key pk and C1 = Es(IDi) is a secret stored in the tamper-resistant device of Ui.
Then, the smart appliance Ui sends C3 = epk(IDikC1kr1) to the substation Sj.
2) In this step, the substation Sj obtains IDi, C1 and r1 by decrypting the receiving message
C3 via its private key sk. Then, it checks whether IDi is valid by matching it in the ID table. If
not valid, the authentication process stops. Otherwise, the substation Sj uses the system key s to
decrypt C1 and then gets the IDi. Next, it compares the value of IDi in C3 with that of IDi in
decrypted message C1. If they are not equivalent, the substation terminates the authentication
process; otherwise, the substation chooses two random integers r22RZp and r32RZp to calculate
the shared session key SK = h(r1kr2) and authentication message C4 ¼ Er1ðSIDjkr2Þ, where
Er1ðÞ denotes the secure symmetric encryption algorithm with the secret key r1. Finally, the
substation Sj submits the message (C4, r3) to Ui.
Here the random integer r3 needs not be encrypted because it is used to check the freshness
of the message only and is not connected with the final session key in any way. Even if the
adversary obtained the random integer r3, the shared key could not be compromised. Thus, the
random integer r3 is transmitted in plaintext, and this method has been widely used in authen-
tication protocols to check the freshness of the message.
3) After receiving the message (C4, r3), the smart appliance Ui adopts r1 to decrypt C4 and
then obtains r2 and SIDj. Then it calculates SIDjP and checks whether the following equation
holds C2¼? SIDjP. If the equation holds, the smart appliance Ui calculates the shared session key
SK' = h(r1kr2) and the authentication message C5 = h(SK'k(r3 + 1)). And then Ui submits the
authentication message C5 to the substation Sj. Otherwise, the smart appliance Ui rejects the
message and terminates the authentication process.
4) Upon receiving the message C5, the substation Sj checks whether the value of the received
C5 equals to the value of the computed h(SKk(r3 + 1)). If true, the substation Sj sets SK as the
shared session key with the smart appliance Ui; otherwise, it terminates the authentication
process.
In the proposed protocol, if the substation Dn needs to be changed, it submits all the shared
keys between itself and corresponding smart appliance to the control center over a secure chan-
nel and then deletes the ID table and the shared keys from its memory. Next the control center
transforms ID table including all identities of the smart appliance associated with substation
Dn and all the session keys submitted from Dn to the new substation Dl over a secure channel.
In addition, the control center also chooses a secure one-way hash function and transforms it
to the substation Dl. After the substation Dl finishes the initialization procedure, it adopts the
corresponding shared key to encrypt the secret information including the pair secret (C1, C2),
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the public key pk and the hash function. Then the substation Dl can transmit the secret infor-
mation securely to the corresponding smart appliance. Consequently, the tamper-resistant
devices can update the secret information securely. And the new session key between the new
substation Dl and the smart appliance can be achieved by running the proposed key agreement
protocol to realize the secure and easy change of the substation.
In the proposed protocol, instead of preloading the shared key, the secret (C1,C2) as “material”
is stored in the tamper-resistant device of the smart appliance to help realize mutual authentication
and key agreement. The session key is constructed by two high-entropy random integers chosen
by the substation and the smart appliance freely, and the session key varies in each authentication
and key agreement process, that is, the secret (C1,C2) is not connected with the final computed ses-
sion key. Thus, even the secret (C1, C2) stored in the tamper-resistant device was compromised,
the session key would not be leaked and the adversary could not obtain the information transmit-
ted between the smart appliance and the substation encrypted by the session key. Under this case,
if the secret (C1, C2) was compromised, the message relayed between the smart appliance and the
substation would not be exposed to the adversary. On the contrary, if the shared key was preloaded
into a tamper-resistant device, the adversary could launch the capture attack to obtain the shared
key, and then could use it to decrypt the message communicated between the smart appliance and
the substation. In addition, the solution of preloading the shared key requires the substation stor-
ing the shared keys for each smart appliance. Once the substation was compromised by the adver-
sary, all the shared keys would be revealed. Furthermore, the associated problems of shared key
updating and maintaining make this security measure hard to scale up.
Security Analysis
Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic [20] is the first belief logic which has been widely used to for-
mally analyze the completeness of protocols. A great effort has been put into overcoming its
limitations [21]. Gong-Needham-Yahalom (GNY) logic [22] is one of these extensions. And it
has successfully disclosed redundancies or found defects in several protocols. Therefore, we
adopted the GNY logic to evaluate the security of our proposed protocol.
In this section, some formulae and statements used in the GNY logic are introduced first;
then the goals and the assumptions of the proposed protocol are set; finally the GNY logic is
adopted to prove that the proposed protocol is valid and practical.
Formulae and statements
In the GNY logic, a formula is a name used to refer to a bit string, which has a particular value
in a run [22]. In order to describe the GNY logic, first let symbols X and Y range over formulae.
Then, some formulae used in our authentication proof are introduced and the complete list of
all logical postulates is described in [22].
1. (X, Y): conjunction of two formulae X and Y.
2. {X}K and fXg1K : symmetrically encrypt and decrypt X with the key K.
3. {X}+K and {X}-K: asymmetrically encrypt and decrypt X with the public key +K and the pri-
vate key -K.
4. h(X): a one-way function of X.
5. X: X is not originated here.
A basic statement reflects some property of a formula. Let symbols P and Q be principals.
The following are statements used in our authentication proof.
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1. P⊲X: P is told formula X.
2. P3X: P possesses formula X.
3. P|*X: P once conveyed formula X.
4. P|#(X): P believes that X is fresh.
5. P|ϕ(X): P believes that X is recognizable.
6. Pj  P$S Q: P believes that S is a suitable secret for P and Q.
7. P|)X: P has jurisdiction over X.
8. P⊲X: P is told that a formula X which did not convey previously in the current run.
Protocol descriptions and goals
In this subsection, some notations are changed to fit the GNY logic and the proposed protocol
are transformed into the form of P!Q:(X). In addition, the server’s private key is denoted as–
K and the corresponding public key is denoted as +K.
1. U! S: ({IDik{IDi}skr1}+K)
2. S ! U : ðfSIDjkr2gr1 ; r3Þ
3. U! S: (h(h(r1kr2)k(r3 + 1)))
Next, our goals which consist of three aspects are described in detail.
(1) Message content authentication
Goal 1: S believes the message in the first run is recognizable.
Sj  fIDikfIDigskr1gþK
Goal 2: U believes the message in the second run is recognizable.
Uj  ðfSIDjkr2gr1 ; r3Þ
Goal 3: S believes the message in the third run is recognizable.
Sj  ðhðhðr1kr2Þkðr3 þ 1ÞÞÞ
(2) Message origin authentication
Goal 4: U believes S conveyed the message in the second run.
U j  Sj  fSIDjkr2gr1
Goal 5: S believes U conveyed the message in the third run.
Sj  U j  hðhðr1kr2Þkðr3 þ 1ÞÞ
(3) Session key material establishment
Goal 6: U believes that S believes that SK is a secret shared between U and S.
Uj  Sj  U$SK S
Goal 7: U believes that SK is a secret shared between U and S.
U j  U$SK S
Elliptic Curve Cryptography-Based Authentication for Smart Grids
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Goal 8: S believes that U possesses SK.
Sj  U 3 SK
Goal 9: S believes that U believes that SK is a secret shared between U and S.
Sj  U j  U$SK S
Assumption list
In this subsection, some assumptions are made as follows:
1. The secret key s is generated by S in the proposed protocol, so S possesses s. S also possesses
the private key–K and the public key +K.
S 3 s; S 3 þK; S 3 K
2. Since S keeps the identity table, S believes that IDi is recognizable.
Sj  ðIDiÞ
3. Since U stores C2 = SIDjP secretly and holds the base point P. Then U can check the SIDj
and believes that SIDj is recognizable.
Uj  ðSIDjÞ
4. The random integer r1 is generated by U in the protocol, so U possesses r1 and believes that
r1 is fresh. U 3 r1,U|#(r1)
5. The random integer r1 is generated by U as part of the temporal session key in the current
run. So, we assume that U believes r1 is a suitable secret for himself and S.
Uj  U$r1 S
6. The random integer r2 and r3 are generated by S in the protocol, so S possesses r2 and r3,
and believes that r3 is recognizable and r2 is fresh.
S 3 r3; Sj  ðr3Þ; S 3 r2; Sj  #ðr2Þ
7. The SK generated by S is a temporal session key in the current run. So we assume that S
believes that SK is a suitable secret between itself and U.
Sj  S$SK U
8. U believes that the server S is an authority on generating a suitable session key material SK
shared between U and S.
U j  Sj ) U$SK S
Elliptic Curve Cryptography-Based Authentication for Smart Grids
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Authentication proof using GNY logic
In this subsection, we adopt the GNY logic to analyze our protocol. A complete list of all logical
postulates and the index in the list is provided [22], such as (T1, P1), to show how to achieve
the goals.
(1) The first run:
Sj  ðIDiÞ; S 3 s
Sj  fIDigs; Sj  ðIDikfIDigskr1Þ
ðR1;R2Þ
If S believes that IDi is recognizable and S possesses the key s, then S is entitled to believe
that the encryption of IDi with the key s is recognizable and then the formula {IDik{IDi}skr1} is
also recognizable.
Sj  ðIDikfIDigskr1Þ; S 3 þK
Sj  fIDikfIDigskr1gþK
ðR3Þ
If S believes (IDik{IDi}skr1) is recognizable and S possesses a public key +K, then it believes
that the encryption {IDik{IDi}skr1}+K is recognizable. Therefore, in the proposed protocol, the
server S can recognize the message {IDik{IDi}skr1}+K in the ﬁrst run. (Goal 1)
(2) The second run:
U j  ðSIDjÞ;U 3 r1
U j  ðSIDjkr2Þ;Uj  fSIDjkr2gr1
ðR1;R2Þ
If U believes that SIDj is recognizable, then U is entitled to believe that the formula (SIDjkr2)
of which SIDj is a component, is recognizable. Since U possesses r1, it also believes that the
encryption fSIDjkr2gr1 is recognizable.
Sj  fSIDjkr2gr1
Sj  ðfSIDjkr2gr1 ; r3Þ
ðR1Þ
If S believes fSIDjkr2gr1 is recognizable, then it is entitled to believe that ðfSIDjkr2gr1 ; r3Þ, of
which fSIDjkr2gr1 is a component, is recognizable. So, we can conclude that in the proposed
protocol, U can recognize the message ðfSIDjkr2gr1 ; r3Þ in the second run. (Goal 2)
U⊲fSIDjkr2gr1 ;U 3 r1;U j  U$
r1 S;U j  ðSIDjkr2Þ;Uj  #ðr1Þ
U j  Sj  fSIDjkr2gr1 ;U j  S 3 r1
ðI1Þ
If the following five conditions hold: 1) U receives the formula (SIDjkr2) encrypted with the
key r1 and marked with a not-originated-here mark; 2) U possesses r1; 3) U believes that r1 is a
suitable secret for himself and S; 4) U believes that the formula (SIDjkr2) is recognizable; and 5)
U believes that r1 is fresh. Then U is entitled to believe that 1) S once conveyed (SIDjkr2)
encrypted with r1 and 2) U believes that the S possesses r1. (Goal 4)
According to the GNY logic, we assume that U|S|)S|, that is, U believes that S is hon-
est and competent, and then we can deduce the following statement:
Uj  Sj ) Sj  ;U j  Sj  ðfSIDjkr2gr1 ; r3Þ>Sj  U$
SK
SÞ;U j  #ðfSIDjkr2gr1 ; r3Þ
Uj  Sj  U$SK S
ðJ2Þ
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If U believes that S is honest and competent; and U receives a message
ðfSIDjkr2gr1 ; r3Þ>Sj  U$
SK SÞ, which it believes S conveyed, then U ought to believe that S
really believes U$SK S. Therefore, U believes that S believes that SK is a suitable secret between
U and S. (Goal 6)
U j  Sj ) U$SK S;U j  Sj  U$SK S
Uj  U$SK S
ðJ1Þ
If U believes that S is an authority on the statement U$SK S and S believe in U$SK S, then
U ought to believe in U$SK S as well. So, U believes that SK is a suitable secret between U and
S. (Goal 7)
(3) The third flow:
S⊲fIDikfIDigskr1gþK ; S 3 K
S⊲ðIDikfIDigskr1Þ; S⊲r1
ðT3;T4Þ
If S is told a formula (IDik{IDi}skr1) encrypted with the public key +K and it possesses the
corresponding private key–K, then it is considered to have been told the decrypted contents of
that encrypted formula. And it has also been told r1 as the formula’s components.
S⊲r1; S 3 r2; S 3 r3
S 3 r1; S 3 ðr1kr2Þ; S 3 hðr1kr2Þ; S 3 ðr3 þ 1Þ
ðP1;P2;P4Þ
If S is told r1, it is capable of possessing r1. And if S also possesses r2, it is capable of possess-
ing (r1kr2) and h(r1kr2). For the same reason, if S possesses r3 then it possesses (r3+1).
S 3 hðr1kr2Þ; S 3 ðr3 þ 1Þ
S 3 ðhðr1kr2Þkðr3 þ 1ÞÞ
ðP2Þ
If S possesses h(r1kr2) and (r3+1), then it possesses (h(r1kr2)k(r3 + 1)) as well.
Sj  ðr3Þ
Sj  ðhðr1kr2Þkðr3 þ 1ÞÞ
ðR1Þ
If S believes that r3 is recognizable, then S believes that (r3+1) is recognizable and (h(r1kr2)k
(r3 + 1)), of which (r3+1) is a component, is also recognizable.
Sj  ðhðr1kr2Þkðr3 þ 1ÞÞ; S 3 ðhðr1kr2Þkðr3 þ 1ÞÞ
Sj  hðhðr1kr2Þkðr3 þ 1ÞÞ
ðR5Þ
If S believes that (h(r1kr2)k(r3 + 1)) is recognizable and it also possesses (h(r1kr2)k(r3 + 1)),
and then it is entitled to believe that h(h(r1kr2)k(r3 + 1)) is recognizable. So, we can say that S
believes that the message h(h(r1kr2)k(r3 + 1)) in the third run is recognizable. (Goal 3)
Sj  #ðr2Þ; S 3 ðr1kr2Þ
Sj  #ðr1kr2Þ; Sj  #ðhðr1kr2ÞÞ
ðF1; F10Þ
If S believes r2 is fresh then it is entitled to believe that h(r1kr2) is fresh. And then if S also
possesses (r1kr2), it is entitled to believe that h(r1kr2) is fresh.
S⊲hððr3 þ 1Þ; < SK >Þ; S 3 ððr3 þ 1Þ; SKÞ; Sj  S$
SK
U ; Sj  #ðSKÞ
Sj  U j  ððr3 þ 1Þ; < SK >Þ; Sj  Uj  hððr3 þ 1Þ; < SK >Þ
ðI3Þ
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If all of the following conditions hold: 1) S receives a formula consisting of a one way func-
tion of (r3+1) and SKmarked with a not-originated-here mark; 2) S possesses (r3+1) and SK; 3)
S believes SK is a suitable secret for itself and U; 4) S believes that SK is fresh. Then S is entitled
to believe that U once conveyed ((r3+1), SK) and h(h(r1kr2)k(r3 + 1)).Therefore, we can say
that S believes that the message h(h(r1kr2)k(r3 + 1)) in the third run of the proposed protocol is
conveyed from the U. (Goal 5)
Sj  U j  ððr3 þ 1Þ; SKÞ; Sj  #ðSKÞ
Sj  U j  SK; Sj  U 3 SK ðI6; I7Þ
If S believes that U once conveyed the formula ((r3+1), SK), then it is entitled to believe that
U once conveyed SK. And if S also believes that SK is fresh, then it is entitled to believe that U
possesses SK. Therefore, S believes that SK is possessed by U. (Goal 8)
According to the GNY logic, we assume that U|S|)S|, that is, S believes that U is hon-
est and competent, and then we can deduce the following statement:
Sj  Uj ) Uj  ; Sj  U j  ðhðSKkðr3 þ 1ÞÞ>Uj  U$
SK
SÞ; Sj  #ðSKkðr3 þ 1ÞÞ
Sj  U j  U$SK S
ðJ2Þ
If S believes thatU is honest and competent, and S receives a message hðSKkðr3 þ 1ÞÞ>Uj 
U$SK S which it believes is conveyed byU, then S ought to believe thatU really believesU$SK S.
So, we can conclude that in the proposed protocol, S believes that SK is a suitable secret betweenU
and S. (Goal 9)
Complexity Analysis
In this section, we first summarize the functionalities of the proposed protocol, and then evalu-
ate the computational cost of the protocol.
As an attractive feature, our protocol provides identity protection including the identities of
the smart appliance and the substation. In the proposed protocol, the adversary cannot obtain
the real identities of the smart appliance and the substation since the identities are transmitted
in ciphertext. So even if the adversary compromises the secret (C1, C2) stored in the tamper-
resistant device and intercepts all the messages transmitted between the smart appliance and
the substation, she/he cannot obtain the real identities of the smart appliance and the substa-
tion. In addition, the proposed protocol also provides mutual authentication and key agree-
ment to protect the communications between the smart appliance and the substation. Next, we
compare the computational cost of the proposed protocol with other related protocols. Some
notations are defined as follows:
1. Tm: the time for executing a modular exponentiation operation.
2. Te: the time for executing a scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve.
3. Th: the time for executing a one-way hash function.
4. Tse: the time for executing a symmetric key encryption operation.
5. Tsd: the time for executing a symmetric key decryption operation.
6. Tae: the time for executing an asymmetric key encryption operation.
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7. Tad: the time for executing an asymmetric key decryption operation.
8. Thmac: the time for executing a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
operation
As shown in Table 2, in the proposed protocol, the computational cost at the substation Sj
side is Te+Tse during the initialization phase. One scalar multiplication operation Te is used to
compute the secret C2 = SIDjP. And one symmetric key encryption operation Tse is used to gen-
erate another secret C1 = Es(IDi) through using the system key s. In the authentication phase,
the computational cost at the substation Sj side is Tad +Th +Tsd+ Tse, and the computational
cost at the smart appliance Ui side is Tae + Tsd + Te + Th. The smart appliance Ui takes one
asymmetric key encryption operation via the substation Sj’s public key pk to generate C3 =
epk(IDikC1kr1); takes one symmetric key decryption operation to get SIDj and r2; takes one sca-
lar multiplication operation to compute SIDjP; and takes a one-way hash function operation to
calculate C5 = h(SK'k(r3 + 1)). The substation Sj takes one asymmetric key decryption operation
to get the smart appliance Ui’s identity IDi, the random integer r1 and the authentication mes-
sage C1; takes a one-way hash function operation to obtain h(SKk(r3 + 1)); and takes one sym-
metric key decryption operation and one symmetric key encryption operation. So, the total
computational cost of the proposed protocol is 2Te+Tae+Tad +2Tsd+2Tse+2Th. The theoretical
analysis and experimental results [25] show that the modular exponentiation operation Tm and
the asymmetric key encryption/decryption operations Tae/Tad are much higher than that of the
symmetric key encryption/decryption operations Tse/Tsd and the scalar multiplication opera-
tion of elliptic curve Te. In addition, compared with the asymmetric key encryption/decryption
operations Tae/Tad and the modular exponentiation operation Tm, the computational cost of
hash function operation Th could be ignored. Close analysis of the data in Table 2, shows that
our proposed protocol is more efficient than and Mostafa et al.’s protocol [5], because it elimi-
nates the expansive modular exponentiation operations and reduces the numbers of asymmet-
ric key encryption/decryption operations. In addition, compared with Chim et al.’s protocol
[4], our protocol reduces the computational cost at the smart appliance side. Although Chim
et al.’s protocol possesses better performance at the substation side in comparison with the pro-
posed protocol, their protocol cannot support mutual authentication and fails to provide a key
agreement.
Then, we discuss the communication and storage overhead by comparing our proposed
protocol with other protocols. Since Mostafa et al.’s protocol do not use tamper-resistant
device, we only compared storage overhead with Chim et al.’s protocol at the smart appliance
side. In our protocol, the smart appliance needs to store a hash function and the secure infor-
mation (C1, C2, pk, P), where C1, C2, and P are 1024 bits, and pk is 128 bits. The total storage
overhead needed at the tamper-resistant devices in our protocol is 3200 bits. In Chim et al.’s
Table 2. Computational costs comparison between our protocol and others.
Our protocol Chim et al.’s protocol [4] Mostafa et al.’s protocol [5]
Smart appliance Te+Tae+Tsd+Th 2Tae+Thmac -----
Substation Te +Tad+2Tse+ Tsd+Th Thmac -----
Control center ----- 2Tad -----
HAN ----- ----- 2Tm+Tae+Tad+Th+Thmac
BAN ----- ----- 2Tm+ Tae +Tad+Th
Total Tae+Tad+2Th+2Te+2Tse+2Tsd 2Tae+2Tad+ 2Thmac 2Tae+2Tad+2Th+4Tm+Thmac
HAN: home area network; BAN: building area network
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151253.t002
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protocol, the tamper-resistant needs to store the public key Pubcc, the secret key Sr, a pair pri-
vate and public key, the identity of smart appliance RIDi and HMAC function. Where Pubcc is
1024 bits, Sr is 128 bits, RIDi is 32 bits and a pair key is 2048 bits. Therefore, the total overhead
at the tamper-resistant devices side in Chim et al.’s protocol is larger than 3232 bits. As shown
in Table 3, Compared with Chim et al.’s protocol, our proposed protocol reduced the storage
overhead at the tamper-resistant side.
We hereby present the communication overhead of the proposed protocol. In our experi-
ments, the user’s ID was 32 bits, the timestamp was 32 bits, the random number was 64 bits,
the signature was 160 bits, and a modular exponentiation was 512 bits. In addition, the output
of a 256-bit AES was based on the input of the plaintext. We assume that RSA was adopted as
public key encryption/decryption algorithm in protocols [4, 5].The communication cost com-
parisons between our protocol and others are shown in Table 3. In our proposed protocol, the
average communication cost was 608 bits. Compared with the protocols in [4, 5], the proposed
protocol scaled down the communication cost significantly.
Conclusion
An efficient authentication protocol with identity protection for smart grids has been proposed
in this paper. In the proposed protocol, based on elliptic curve cryptography the substations
and smart appliances realized mutual authentication and key agreement via a tamper-resistant
device. In addition, the identities of the smart appliance and the substation are transmitted in
ciphertext in the proposed protocol. So the adversary cannot obtain the real identities of the
smart appliance and the substation. Furthermore, the completeness of the proposed protocol is
demonstrated by Gong, Needham, and Yahalom (GNY) logic. And performance analysis
shows that our proposed protocol increases efficiency in comparison with other related proto-
cols. Therefore, the proposed protocol is more suitable for the smart grids.
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